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Donald Wayne Viney 
 
 
 No one has done more in this generation to rehabilitate free will than Robert Kane 
(Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin). Calling his position “free willist”—an expression 
borrowed from William James—Kane develops a nuanced theory of free will while engaging the 
best contemporary theorists in balanced argument. Throughout the book, but especially in the 
concluding chapter, Kane reflects on the implications of his theory for ethics, political 
philosophy, and cosmology. 
 
 Although the question of free will is ancient and takes many forms, Kane finds the key to 
contemporary debates in an exchange between John Bramhall and Thomas Hobbes in the 1650s. 
Bramhall claimed that free will and determinism are antithetical. Hobbes countered that these are 
“confused and empty” words. It is confused to identify free will with indeterminism; on the other 
hand, talk of the self determining itself is empty since it involves appeal to obscure forms of 
agency. For Hobbes, persons are self-determining when nothing prevents them from doing what 
they intend or desire to do. This sort of freedom, however, does not require that their intentions 
or desires be uncaused—hence, its name, compatibilist freedom. With some notable exceptions 
(e.g. Reid, Kant, Lequyer, Kierkegaard, James, Hartshorne, Sartre), philosophers have sided with 
Hobbes. 
 
 Kane agrees that free will is not the same as indeterminism. Although the Epicureans 
made room for free will by postulating a chance “swerve” in the atoms, it is a mistake to equate 
freedom with mere randomness. Kane also concedes that there are significant kinds of 
freedom—freedoms “worth wanting” in the words of Daniel Dennett—even in a deterministic 
world. Nevertheless, he takes Bramhall’s side insofar as he claims that there is a significant kind 
of freedom that is incompatible with determinism. Kane defines free will as “the power of agents 
to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes” (4). He 
maintains that if this sort of freedom exists then some of our decisions are not made inevitable by 
antecedent causes. 
 
 Some of the clearest examples where free will may be exercised are situations in which 
one is torn between alternatives, each of which recommends itself, but for incommensurable sets 
of reasons. In these situations, Kane argues, one’s choice is undetermined because the effort 
involved in adjudicating the inner conflict is indeterminate. One’s prior character and motives 
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explain both the effort one makes and why it is an effort; but they do not completely explain the 
choice one makes. One’s choice initiates a “value experiment” whose justification lies in the 
future (145). Kane marks this as “the essence of free will” (208). He defends the intelligibility of 
this picture by arguing that, whichever choice one makes, it is one’s own, it is rational, and it is 
under one’s control. 
 
 Kane advances beyond armchair theorizing while always remaining sensitive to the 
philosophical dimensions of the debate. This differentiates his discussion from so many other 
treatments of free will by philosophers and scientists. He adheres to what he calls “the free 
agency principle,” a methodological rule that prevents one from postulating special kinds of 
entities or forms of causation that are not required for agency in general (116). In other words, 
incompatibilist and compatibilist theories of free will should be on the same ontological footing. 
 
 The implication of the free agency principle for Kane’s theory is clear: if free choices are 
undetermined by antecedent causes, then the atoms must somewhere “swerve,” and they must 
swerve in the places where it matters, i.e. in the brain (17). Kane proposes, as a working 
hypothesis, that “indeterminate efforts of will are complex chaotic processes in the brain, 
involving neural networks that are globally sensitive to quantum indeterminacies at the neuronal 
level” (130). If this is correct, then micro-indeterminacies in the brain are amplified to the 
macro-level. What an agent experiences within him/herself as an effort of will, an external 
observer, in examining the agent’s brain, would find indeterminate processes. 
 
 Two welcome consequences of Kane’s theory are that it sidesteps the simplistic 
dichotomy of nature vs. nurture and it avoids the extremes of unqualified determinism and 
radical freedom of the will. Free will, as Kane conceives it, is conditioned, hemmed about by 
circumstances, and subject to degrees (213). This opens up such questions as how much free will 
we have, how widespread it is, and at what developmental stages it begins to exist. These are 
some of the passages in the labyrinth of free will that Kane leaves unexplored (5). One may 
thank him nonetheless for laying the groundwork that makes such questions theoretically 
intelligible.   
    
 
    
 
   
